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Abstract: This essay on judicial review approaches its subject obliquely. It focuses on a 
particular site of constitutional abnormality: prerogative power. An analysis of the various 
iterations, historical and contemporary, between law and prerogative in its specific, rooted 
setting provides the basis for a more general account of the contemporary nature and role of 
judicial review, at a time when we appear to be entering a new ‘age of prerogative’ based on the 
politics of security and fear. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Legal scholarship seems to thrive these days on the production of intense and 
apparently Manichaean oppositions. So, one of the contributors to this collection 
confidently divides the world between ‘judicial review lovers’ and ‘judicial review 
haters’.1 Yet what is striking about the judicial review debate today is not so much 
the surface sturm und drang which, in as much as it does exist seems no more 
extensive and probably less intense than in many other disciplines, but rather its 
curiously dispassionate quality. This sanguine attitude fits the object of inquiry, 
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1 A. Kavanagh, ‘Constitutional Review, the Courts and Democratic Scepticism’ (2009) 62 Current Legal 
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grounded as it is in the measured language of Enlightenment Rationalism and 
rooted in a basic opposition of ‘passions’ to ‘reason’: the structuring and 
tempering, that is, of the dynamic and creative impulses of politics with the 
inherent reasonableness of settled law.2  
The contemporary judicial review debate, uncommonly rich in certain 
regards, takes place within a narrow range. Scholarship is reduced temporally. 
Relentlessly focused on the present, it largely ignores – storybook Whig narratives 
aside – even its own origins and development. It is also reduced in range and 
ambition, in that it too readily assumes an easy umbilical connection between 
judicial review and individual rights. This double reduction may relate to 
background politics. We may not have witnessed an end to history in Fukuyama’s 
sense, but the intense ideological conflicts that fuelled debates on judicial review a 
generation or so ago are now a distant memory.3 We all seem to be, in some sense 
or other, liberals now. It may also relate to the normalization of the practice of 
judicial review, which has established itself just about everywhere as a fixture of 
the political landscape. This process of entrenchment tends to undercut ‘first-
order’ debates about the legitimacy of judicial review, giving root-and-branch 
critiques an abstract, even antique, feel.4 A return to a lost Eden – or, depending 
on your point of view, that ‘place of utter darkness, fitliest called Chaos’5 – where 
minimalist (‘sporadic and peripheral’) judicial review grubbed around in the 
political undergrowth is no longer a realistic option.6 Apart from anything else, it 
runs counter to the strong modern instinct to distrust legally unregulated exercises 
of political power.7  
Judicial review has become normal or normalized, then, a basic accoutrement 
of the rule of law within a constitutional democracy.8 (This does not mean that it 
has become uncontroversial.9 Public law being a form of politics, it could hardly be 
so.) But a competing, anti-normalizing tendency is fast becoming a defining theme 
of 21st century politics. Whether the immediate object is international terrorism, 
financial meltdown, health epidemics, or environmental disasters, governments 
                                                     
2 See, eg, S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).  
3 cf J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1; or better still Griffith, 
‘Why We Need a Revolution’ (1969) 40 Political Quarterly, 383. 
4 Even Jeremy Waldron, the sceptics’ current standard-bearer, has developed positions on ius gentium 
(‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review, 129) and the illegality of 
torture (‘Torture and Positive Law’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review, 1681) that sit uncomfortably with the 
anti-judicial review position with which his name is more closely associated. It is worth recalling that this 
position in any case (a) relates only to ‘constitutional judicial review’ and (b) only applies where there is a 
properly functioning democracy in operation. See, eg, J. Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal, 1346.  
5 Milton, Paradise Lost, Book I: The Argument.  
6 M. Tushnet, ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based 
Worries’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review, 813, 814.  
7 See, eg, J. Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 1. 
8 Compare, for instance, how Joseph Raz’s thinking has changed on this subject from his ‘The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue’ (1979) 93 LQR 195 to ‘The Politics of the Rule of Law’ in Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
9 See, eg, D. Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ (2006) Public Law 722.  
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everywhere talk about the need to agglomerate and streamline power to meet 
immediate or predicted crises. This phenomenon relates no doubt to our tendency 
to think in terms of risk. Giddens and other risk society theorists speak of 
‘manufactured risk’: risks that result from processes of modernization, especially in 
the fields of science and technology, that create risk environments that have little 
or no historical reference and are as such largely unpredictable.10 There may also 
be a connection between the ‘neurotic style’ of contemporary politics and what 
Marquand calls the ‘bland, almost narcotic populism’11 that drives it. Political 
commentators worry that Tocqueville’s nightmare is poised to become reality: a 
society conditioned by individualism in which isolated citizens are easy to 
manipulate, their will softly bent and shaped by charismatic leaders, and where 
‘each nation is reduced to a flock of timid and industrious animals of which the 
government is the shepherd’.12 Government calls for exceptional powers and 
atypical legal frameworks are often defended on grounds of security, where 
‘security’ embraces not only the traditional Hobbesian categories of defence 
against internal and external threat,13 but also protection against anti-social 
behaviour,14 perhaps even the nutritional health of citizens.15 However sceptical 
we are and however we might fear Tocqueville’s dystopian vision of the decline of 
democracies, we cannot in all instances dismiss these claims out of hand as 
straightforward power-grabs by rent-seeking politicos.  
Claims for exceptional powers have become part of the basic script of 
contemporary politics, and are problematic for judicial review. (Even more so in a 
climate where judicial review has become more prominent within public life, if 
only for the simple reason that more is now expected of it.) The claims usually 
relate to events that are likely to happen – or so we are told – in near future. As 
well as being about the selection of what current preferences will count as 
priorities, arguments about risk and about security are attempts to tame the 
future.16 They sketch (in Pascal’s phrase) a ‘geometry of hazard’ to be played out in 
the domain of a necessarily unknowable future. They are, as such, structurally 
dismissive of the past. Past solutions tend to be presented as failed solutions, 
inadequate to meet novel demands. Judicial review, by contrast, looks to the past 
for sustenance and normative content. Its principles and its guiding sense of what 
                                                     
10 A. Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 4. See also U. Beck, Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992).   
11 D. Marquand, ‘Democracy in Britain’ (2000) 71 Political Quarterly 268, 269. 
12 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Everyman, 1994), vol 2, book 4, ch 6. Compare John 
Gray’s notion of ‘agonistic liberalism’: Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age 
(London: Routledge, 1996), ch 6.  
13 See, eg, I. Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
14 See, eg, P. Ramsay, ‘The Responsible Subject as Citizen: Criminal Law, Democracy and the Welfare 
State’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 29; ‘Vulnerability, Sovereignty and Police Power in the ASBO’ in M. 
Dubber and M. Valverde (eds), Police in the Liberal State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
15 See, eg, F. Furedi, Politics of Fear (London: Continuum, 2005).  
16 See, eg, F. Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’ in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). For analysis of risk in the context 
of public law, see E. Fisher, ‘The Rise of the Risk Commonwealth and the Challenge for Administrative 
Law’ (2003) Public Law, 455.  
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counts as ‘reasonable’ are largely derived from the past, either by way of 
incremental development over time,17 or else through reflection on erroneous past 
behaviour (‘social learning’).18 
The cognitive disjunction between a risk-framed and security-driven politics 
and the historically shaped and grounded matrix of law means that the latter tends 
to experience difficulty when confronted with situations presented as exceptional 
or abnormal.19 The cases decided in this ‘red zone’ where security politics and 
‘settled, standing law’20 collide often involve courts having to answer searching 
questions about the legitimacy of judicial review. The answers that they give to 
these questions will, in turn, have an impact (unpredictable no doubt) on the 
general standing of the court. In parallel situations in the past, usually in the 
context of war or serious civil unrest (eg martial law), the law’s response has often 
been muted.21 But the response has been somewhat different in some recent 
terrorism cases, where courts have reaffirmed established values and the court’s 
own role in policing them, often invoking in so doing the spirit of nationalism. 
The US Supreme Court in Hamdi v Rumsfeld applied overarching principles, 
derived from American history, to justify its ruling that an enemy combatant must 
be given an opportunity to contest their detention.22 And more bombast, Lord 
Hoffmann in the Belmarsh case23 ignored European and international legal sources 
and mounted a parochial defence of the legal control to emergency powers that 
was rooted in the specifics of British history.24  
 
 
 
THE PREROGATIVE AND THE BANALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ABNORMALITY 
 
This paper deliberately seeks out the constitutionally abnormal, presenting an 
analysis of judicial review on the margins. Its focus is the prerogative, a zone high 
in the constitutional stratosphere where passions tend to run high and the legal air 
thin. The prerogative (in its strict sense) refers to those powers left over from 
                                                     
17 The classic account in the contemporary era is that of Ronald Dworkin, whose theory of ‘law as 
integrity’ requires the development of legal and constitutional principles through moral/political 
reflection on past practice, especially legal practice: see, eg, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1987).  
18 M. Tushnet, ‘Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime’ (2003) Wisconsin Law 
Review, 273.  
19 A theme explored in T. Poole, ‘Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in ‘Times of Crisis’’ (2008) Public 
Law 234.  
20 J. Locke, Second Treatise on Government (1690), § 137.  
21 See, eg, D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
22 542 US (2004) 1, 25 (O’Connor J): ‘during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our 
Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must 
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.’ 
23 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
24 T. Poole, ‘Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case’ (2005) 32 
Journal of Law and Society 534.  
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when the monarch was directly involved in government, powers that now include 
making treaties, declaring war, deploying the armed forces, regulating the civil 
service, and granting honours and pardons. Prerogative powers are exercised today 
by government ministers, or else by the monarch personally acting in almost all 
conceivable instances under direction from ministers.25 This basic definition 
shows that the prerogative has two faces – ordinary and extraordinary. The special 
and emergency powers it contains come mixed up with far more ordinary powers 
(eg over the civil service) and there is nothing formal or procedural separating one 
from the other. We might say, then, that the elements of constitutional 
abnormality within the prerogative exhibit a banal quality.  
The choice of subject might seem eccentric. The rise of statute has led to 
prerogative’s decline. This fact, as well as its regal association and origins ‘time out 
of mind’, combine to give the prerogative a musty feel. But the prerogative was 
central to British constitutional development. At the epicentre of the 17th century 
crises out of which rose the modern constitutional settlement, it was also bound 
up with the creation of Britain’s thalassocratic empire.26 The prerogative remains 
vital to the way in which the constitution is understood, acting as a kind of 
chiaroscuro against which more mainstream and better lit elements of the 
constitution are framed and their features brought out. The Whig narrative, which 
dominated political discourse from the Glorious Revolution, saw the prerogative 
squarely as the villain of the piece. This sentiment is well captured by John Allen 
in his 19th century treatise on prerogative: ‘Like the good and evil principles of the 
Persian magi, liberty and prerogative have been in perpetual conflict.’27 But even 
those working within the Whig tradition did not deny that the prerogative, 
although undoubtedly an aberrant power to be treated with suspicion, was 
fundamental to the maintenance of constitutional order.28 Locke, one of the 
founding fathers of the Whig tradition and more familiar than most with the way 
prerogative might be misused, rejected the civic republican call for the abolition of 
prerogative power in his chapter on king’s prerogative in the Second Treatise.29 
Even now, when the prerogative is no longer central to the grand narrative of 
British constitutional politics, traces of the older dialectic remain. The prerogative 
has a habit of resurfacing, with a whiff of sulphur, at moments of political tension. 
                                                     
25 There are also so-called ‘personal prerogatives’ which are exercised by the monarch herself. These 
include powers to appoint the Prime Minister, to dissolve Parliament, and to give Royal Assent to 
legislation. All these powers are strongly hedged by constitutional conventions. The Government has 
recently announced plans for a sweeping reform of prerogative power: see The Governance of Britain Green 
Paper (July 2007) and the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (March 2008).  
26 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum (New York: 
Telos, 2006).  
27 J. Allen, Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the Royal Prerogative in England (London: Longman, 1849), 10.  
28 Although not a Whig – or at least not straightforwardly so – this was also the position of David Hume. 
See his ‘Of Passive Obedience’ in David Hume: Essays Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, E.F. Miller (ed), 1987). On whether Hume was a Whig see, eg, J. Conniff, ‘Hume on Political 
Parties: The Case for Hume as a Whig’ (1978) 12 Eighteenth-Century Studies 150.  
29 n 20 above. See also, eg, C. Fatovic, ‘Constitutionalism and Contingency: Locke’s Theory of 
Prerogative’ (2004) 25 History of Political Thought 276; P. Pasquino, ‘Locke on Kings’ Prerogative’ (1988) 26 
Political Theory 198.  
                  5/2010 
 
 6
The war in Iraq is a recent case in point. The public were alarmed to (re)discover 
that government has no obligation to get Parliament’s approval before taking the 
country to war – its prerogative powers are sufficient. (Not that it would have 
made much difference. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, went to Parliament and 
got his vote.) Calls for reform followed. But, even if reform did occur and the 
kingly overtones of prerogative were removed, executive powers along similar 
lines would spring up in their place. These ‘prerogative’ powers (in the broad 
sense) would, as now, include emergency and reserve powers, and would still 
connect to personal (and charismatic) authority. It is this broader sense of the 
term that Judith Butler uses to describe the ‘legal black hole’ in Guantanamo Bay – 
the handiwork of a ‘resurgent prerogative’30 – and Ernst Fraenkel uses to explain 
Nazi Germany as a ‘Prerogative State’ in which ordinary law becomes eroded by 
‘arbitrary measures, in which the dominant officials exercise their discretionary 
prerogatives’ in the interests of the Party.31  
While prerogative in its strict (and strictly British) sense may well be in 
decline, then, the prerogative in the broader sense is anything but. It may be, in 
fact, that we are entering a new ‘age of prerogative’: certainly, the structure of 
prerogative matches in certain key ways the structure of risk and security politics. 
If this is right, then what follows here has even greater salience. The article starts 
by looking at the recent Bancoult case which, for all its idiosyncrasies, provides a 
telling case study of the contemporary state of the law on the prerogative.  
 
 
 
ANCIENT AND MODERN, REVISED: BANCOULT (NO. 2) 
 
Bancoult (No. 2)32 concerned a challenge to the UK government’s decision not to 
repatriate inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, a group of about 60 islands in 
the Indian Ocean. Originally a French possession (and leper colony), it was ceded 
to Britain after Napoleon’s defeat in 1814. The Archipelago was turned into a 
separate territory (the British Indian Overseas Territory) in 1965 and depopulated 
in order to make room for a US military base on the Archipelago’s chief island, 
Diego Garcia. All this was achieved through the exercise of prerogative powers – 
first the BIOT Order 1965 and then the Immigration Ordinance 1971, which gave 
the newly establish BIOT Commissioner the authority (in colonial boilerplate) to 
‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the territory’. 
There had been a number of previous cases relating to the expulsion of the 
Chagossians in British courts. In Bancoult (No. 1), the 1971 Ordinance was held 
unlawful on the ground that a power to legislate for the ‘peace, order and good 
                                                     
30 J. Butler, ‘Indefinite Detention’ in Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: 
Verso, 2006).  
31 E. Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1941), 3.  
32 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61.  
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government’ of BIOT, while broad, did not include a power to exile a people from 
their homelands.33 The people of the islands, as Laws LJ put it, ‘are to be governed: 
not removed’.34 The government issued a statement that it would not challenge 
the ruling. A new Immigration Ordinance was passed in 2000 permitting 
inhabitants to return to the outer islands of the Archipelago, but not to Diego 
Garcia. A feasibility study set up by the government after Bancoult (No. 1) reported 
in 2002 that while resettlement was possible (although expensive) in the short 
term, global warming would make the Archipelago uninhabitable in the longer 
term. The government decided in light of the report not to support resettlement. 
The US government also made known its concern that repopulating the Chagos 
Islands might compromise what it regarded as the unique security of Diego 
Garcia. New Orders were passed reinstating full immigration control.35 The 
claimants in Bancoult (No. 2) challenged these new arrangements. Their challenge 
was successful in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, where it was held that 
the Orders amounted to an abuse of power because, for reasons unconnected with 
their interests, the Orders negated the islanders’ right to return to their 
homeland.36 The government appealed to the House of Lords.  
The case must be set against a complicated back-story involving the law on 
the prerogative.37 It was established long ago that the courts could determine the 
existence and extent of a prerogative power: cases in the early 17th century cases 
confirmed this.38 But it was also understood that courts could not question or 
review the manner in which a prerogative power had been exercised.39 This 
reticence relates to the prerogative’s connection with the notion of ‘the Crown’, an 
unclear but structurally central concept within UK public law.40 Courts have in the 
                                                     
33 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2001] QB 1067. For analysis see S. 
Palmer, ‘“They Made a Dessert and Called it Peace”: Banishment and the Royal Prerogative’ (2001) 
Cambridge Law Journal, 234.  
34 R (Bancoult), ibid at [57]. See also Chagos Islanders v Attorney General [2004] EWCA Civ 997, where the 
Court of Appeal held that this unlawful conduct did not give rise to liability in damages, affirming a 
settlement package agreed by the UK and Chagossian representatives in 1982. 
35 For commentary see S. Allan, ‘International Law and the Resettlement of the (Outer) Chagos Islands’ 
(2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review, 683. 
36 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2007] EWCA Civ 498. For 
analysis see R. Moules, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Orders in Council: Recognising the Constitutional 
Reality of Executive Legislation’ (2008) Cambridge Law Journal 12.  
37 W.W. Lucas, ‘Immunity of the Crown from Mandamus’ (1909) 25 Law Quarterly Review 290, 290: ‘no 
branch of the law is so vague as that which relates to the legal status of the executive of the Crown and 
the relation it bears to the Judiciary’. 
38 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63; Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74 at [76]: ‘the King 
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.’ 
39 The courts also established the principle that if statutory powers exist that cover the same ground as a 
prerogative power, the government is in general not free to choose between them, but must act under the 
statute: Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508. See also the dictum of Lord Diplock 
in BBC v Johns [1965] Ch. 32 at [79] that it was ‘350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to 
broaden the prerogative’.  
40 The constitutional historian F.W. Maitland described the Crown as ‘a convenient cover for ignorance’ 
which ‘saves us from asking difficult questions’: in H.A.L. Fisher (ed), The Constitutional History of England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 418. See also M. Loughlin, ‘The State, the Crown and 
the Law’ in M. Sunkin and S. Payne (eds), The Nature of the Crown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
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past tended to act with special reserve when it came to reviewing legal acts done in 
the name of the Crown. This restrictive approach persisted until the mid-1980s 
when, in the GCHQ case, the House of Lords held that an instruction made under 
an Order in Council (the main form of prerogative legislation) could in principle 
be subject to judicial review.41 The case concerned Margaret Thatcher’s sudden 
decision to deny trade union membership at Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), a military and signals intelligence centre. The ‘law relating 
to judicial review has now reached a stage’, one of the judges said, that ‘if the 
subject matter in respect of which prerogative power is exercised is justiciable’, the 
exercise of power will be subject to ordinary public law principles.42 But the 
modernizing aspects of the case were balanced by the survival of more traditional 
elements. The court went out of its way to identify areas of prerogative law-
making activity that would in all likelihood never be justiciable. Lord Roskill 
detailed a list of ‘excluded categories’ – areas of activity supposedly immune from 
judicial review – that included powers ‘relating to the making of treaties, the 
defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the 
dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of ministers’.43 The prerogative 
might now in principle be classified as a normal sub-statutory source of law for the 
purposes of judicial review; but in practice the courts still seemed to approach it 
with a caution bordering on outright deference. It is worth noting that although 
they won on the point of principle, the civil servants lost their case: their legitimate 
expectation of consultation was trumped by the government’s assessment of the 
national security interests at stake.44 
Bancoult (No. 2) centred on two issues. The first concerned the general 
question of the reviewability of prerogative legislation. This represented some 
unfinished business from the GCHQ case where it was held that acts done in the 
exercise of prerogative powers were reviewable, but left open the question to 
whether the same was true of the prerogative itself. The Law Lords in Bancoult (No. 
2) unanimously ruled that judicial review applied. While it is true that prerogative 
Orders in Council are a type of primary legislation, they said, it does not follow 
that they share all the characteristics of Acts of Parliament, in particular their 
immunity from judicial review.45 The prerogative lacks the representative character 
of an Act of Parliament, so there was ‘no reason why prerogative legislation 
should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of legality, rationality and 
procedural impropriety in the same way as any other executive action.’46 
The second issue concerned the legality of this particular exercise of 
prerogative power, and on this question the House divided (3:2). The majority 
found the 2004 Orders were lawful, holding that the phrase ‘peace, order and 
                                                     
41 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374. 
42 ibid at [387] (per Lord Scarman). 
43 ibid at [418].  
44 See C. Walker, ‘Review of the Prerogative: The Remaining Issues’ (1987) Public Law, 62. 
45 See, eg, British Railways Board v Pickin [1974] A.C. 765.  
46 n 32 above at [35] (Lord Hoffmann).  
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good government’ relates to the governance of the entire Crown realm, and not 
just to those residing (or once residing) in BIOT. The phrase has always been 
treated, they said, ‘as apt to confer plenary law-making authority.’47 Moreover, the 
case fell within a ‘macro-political field’ and was thus ‘particularly within the 
competence of the executive’.48 Scrutiny of this sort of matter fell to Parliament 
and not the courts, since it raised a ‘political, not judicial’ question.49 A ‘rule of 
abstinence’ should be applied: however ‘distasteful’ the court might consider the 
provisions at issue, it should avoid interfering with ‘what is essentially a political 
judgment’.50 The majority also denied that the Chagossians had a legitimate 
expectation arising from the press statement after Bancoult (No. 1) that entitled 
them to resettlement.  
The dissenting judges Lord Bingham and Lord Mance argued that the English 
courts have an inherent jurisdiction to delineate the scope of the prerogative 
power of colonial governance.51 They held that there was no prerogative power to 
make an order whose effect was to exile a population – ‘the reciprocal duties of 
allegiance and protection…cannot ordinarily be discharged by removing and 
excluding the citizen from his homeland.’52 The right of abode is a fundamental 
‘and, in the informal sense in which that term is necessarily used in a United 
Kingdom context, constitutional’ right that has been recognized since Magna 
Carta.53 No permissible distinction could be drawn between British citizens and 
those whose homes are in former colonial territories. Further, the term ‘peace, 
order and good government’ specifies a power ‘intended to enable the proper 
governance of the territory, at least among other things for the benefit of the 
people inhabiting it. A constitution which exiles a territory’s inhabitants is a 
contradiction in terms.’54  
The case is a controversial one, no doubt, and the Law Lords’ decision has 
been met with consternation by most commentators.55 But my concern here is not 
the merits of the case, but what it reveals about the current state of judicial review 
of the prerogative (and more generally about the relationship between law and 
power). For all its idiosyncrasies (and perhaps because of them), Bancoult may be 
                                                     
47 ibid at [50] (Lord Hoffmann).  
48 ibid at [58] (Lord Hoffmann).  
49 ibid at [109] (Lord Rodger).  
50 ibid at [130] (Lord Carswell). Lord Carswell and Lord Rodger also ruled that the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865 precluded judicial review, on the ground that Parliament in 1865 would simply not have 
contemplated the possibility of an Order in Council legislating for a colony as being open to challenge in 
an English court on principles of judicial review. This position relied heavily on a working paper by John 
Finnis: ‘Common Law Constraints: Whose Common Good Counts?’ March 2008) University of Oxford 
Law Faculty Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 10/2008. 
51 See Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp. 204.  
52 n 32 above at [70] (Lord Bingham).  
53 §29 of which provides that ‘No freeman shall be…exiled...but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by 
the Law of the Land’. 
54 n 32 above at [157] (Lord Mance).  
55 See, eg, M. Elliott and A. Perreau-Saussine, ‘Pyrrhic Public Law: Bancoult and the Sources, Status and 
Content of Common Law Limitations on Prerogative Power’ (2009) Public Law, 697.  
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seen as broadly representative of the case law and can thus provide a useful prism 
into this complex zone of constitutional politics.  
Consider first the historical aspects of the case. Constitutional argument often 
involves consideration of the past, a fact to which British constitutional lawyers 
are particularly well attuned. Absent a constitutional text, the past becomes the 
main repository of constitutional principles, principles which need almost 
continual updating and refinement by means of a process of sifting through the 
historical material.56 The past weighs particularly heavily where prerogative is 
concerned, and judges in prerogative cases often talk about ‘the clanking of 
mediaeval chains of the ghosts of the past’.57 But even by these standards Bancoult 
is replete with history. At least three historical strands are in play: (i) a Whig 
narrative according to which liberty and prerogative come fused in a continuous 
struggle for ascendancy; (ii) what might best be described as the English version of 
act of state doctrine,58 which is bound up in the old cases and commentaries with 
the prerogative and the notion of ‘the Crown’; and (iii) a colonial narrative 
involving consideration of the relationship between the Imperial government and 
its overseas dominions. Each historical strand has a contemporary counterpoint. 
The Whig narrative connects with the standard account of the rise of judicial 
review since the 1960s. The act of state narrative meshes with today’s risk and 
security politics. The colonial narrative, played out in a post-colonial space, 
requires courts to consider the extent to which it ought to feel bound by old 
colonialist legal positions.  
The court divided in the face of these encircling historico-legal questions. The 
minority embraced the Whig position, denied the act of state argument, and felt 
free (although they did not express things in these terms) to radically rework a 
neo-imperial provision in a way that avoided injustice.59 The majority distrusted 
the attempt to foist a grand Whiggish narrative on the case. Taking a more 
historically-inflected view of the ‘peace, order and good government’ clause at the 
centre of the litigation, they preferred to navigate a line consistent with the act of 
state principle. This position was more conservative in its approach to the 
prerogative specifically, but also in its understanding of the court’s constitutional 
role.  
Secrecy and the politics of security provide another of the case’s main themes. 
The policy shift at the centre of the case was justified partly on national security 
grounds: the Minister had said in Parliament that ‘developments in the 
international security climate’ since Bancoult (No. 1) were central to the 
                                                     
56 See J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
57 L Atkin in United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1 at [29]; L Roskill in Council of Civil Service 
Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at [417]; L Hooper in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1219 at [158].  
58 W. Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1906).  
59 For a discussion of this perspective in the context of indigenous rights see P.G. McHugh, ‘A History of 
the Modern Jurisprudence of Aboriginal Rights – Some Observations on the Journey So Far’ in D. 
Dyzenhaus, M. Hunt, and G. Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).  
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government’s change of heart.60 The volte face also owed something to US security 
concerns. Remote though it is, Diego Garcia is not peripheral within the post-
9/11 security world. Persistent rumours circulate about its use for ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ flights. Lord Hoffmann referred to these allegations when he said in 
Bancoult (No. 2) that ‘Diego Garcia or a ship in the waters around it have been used 
as a prison in which suspects have been tortured’.61 The US denies these 
allegations, but they are far from implausible. And where secrecy reigns, we 
naturally suspect the presence of unsavoury things.  
Bancoult sits, then, at the confluence of two histories of shady state secrets or 
half secrets. One relates to the shabby dealings of the post-imperial (and Cold 
War) past; the other to contemporary security obsessions and the ‘war on 
terrorism’ (or whatever we are now to call it). The presence of the prerogative here 
is apt,for that source of power has long been associated with constitutional 
exceptionalism and the mysteries of state – a theme explored in the next section. 
Bancoult shows how prerogative is often found at the furthest reaches of 
constitutional discourse.62 In a constitution devoid of clear lines, it is perhaps the 
closest thing we have to Agamben’s idea of a defining threshold or limit concept, a 
zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion where 
sovereign power and bare life threaten to elude the domain of politico-juridical 
representation.63 Agamben’s thesis is that ‘the fundamental activity of sovereign 
power is the production of bare life as originary political element and as the 
threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoē and bios.’64 It is hard to 
resists the parallels between this thesis and the Chagos Islands litigation. On this 
reading, the Chagossians adopt the role of homo sacer, the liminal figure in Roman 
law of the man who can be killed but not murdered whom Agamben takes to be 
emblematic of modern legal order. The sovereign treated them as bodies rather 
than subjects.65 (Worse still, by seeking to deny their existence in the late 1960s, it 
tried to make them ghosts.) And the question at the heart of the litigation becomes 
whether the government’s exercise of sovereign power could be made to fall 
within the domain of law (and if so to what effect). But there is an additional twist. 
Since all parties agreed that the right of repatriation, even if granted, could not be 
vindicated, the case involved not legal rights in the sense that craggy, remedies-
focused common lawyers like Dicey might have recognized, but what might best 
be called ‘pseudo-rights’. 
 
 
                                                     
60 n 32 above at [27].  
61 ibid at [35]. 
62 See further A. Tomkins, ‘Magna Carta, Crown and Colonies’ (2001) Public Law, 571.  
63 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, D. Heller-Rozen (trans) (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998).  
64 ibid, 181.  
65 See also G. Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, K. Attell (trans) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004); R. Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, T. Campbell (trans) (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 2008).  
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THE PREROGATIVE AND ARCANA IMPERII 
 
Bancoult is an extraordinary case. At once on the margins of juridical discourse and 
yet also generating threshold questions of fundamental reach, it combines 
elements of all-but-forgotten history with über-contemporary considerations of 
realpolitik. The case is about everything, since it asks what government can do to us 
in the name of security; but it is also about nothing since the option of awarding a 
real remedy was always foreclosed. It contains shady powers, half-hidden 
diplomatic missives, elusive justifications – even ghosts (of a sort). And it split the 
court down the middle. But elements that might seem specific to Bancoult are in 
fact recurring themes within the history of the prerogative and its iterations with 
law. Or at least this is the proposition that is tested in this section. 
One standard image of prerogative, influenced by Locke, is of a direct and 
unconstrained power, justified usually by the exigencies of circumstance, to be 
exercised in the public good. This vision of prerogative as untrammelled power is 
reflected in the words Shakespeare puts in Macbeth’s mouth when arranging the 
murder of Banquo: ‘though I could / With barefaced power sweep him from my 
sight / And bid my will avouch it’66 But this idea of ‘barefaced power’, justified by 
princely will alone, is misleading. For in fact prerogative is a power that is 
historically modulated, legally bounded, and anything but an uncomplicated 
expression of ‘honest’ brute force.  
As Bancoult suggests, in the prerogative we approach a realm of law inhabited 
by fictions, spectres, and ghosts. It is striking how often the language of the 
supernatural appears in the cases and commentaries on the prerogative.67 It is 
Blackstone, rather than Locke, who provides the surer guide on this particular 
subterranean journey. Blackstone described the prerogative as something ‘singular 
and eccentrical’:  
 
a topic that in some former ages was ranked with among the arcane imperii 
[secrets of state]; and like the mysteries of the bona dea68 was not suffered to 
be pried into by any but such as were initiated in its service; because, perhaps, 
the exertion of one, like the solemnities of the other would not bear 
inspection of a rational and sober inquiry.69 
 
Blackstone, whose interests lay elsewhere, chose not to probe the mythical 
connotations of prerogative. But one way of doing so would be to focus on 
prerogative’s theological associations. Carl Schmitt argued that all the key concepts 
                                                     
66 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act III, Scene I.  
67 See, eg, J. Pryor, ‘Conjuring Spectres: Locating the Constitution of Britain in its Post-Imperial Moment’ 
in Pryor, Constitutions: Writing Nations, Reading Differences (Abingdon: Birkbeck Law Press, 2008).  
68 The ‘good goddess’: refers to the Roman goddess of fertility attended to by the Vestal Virgins.  
69 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I (1765, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
S.N. Katz ed., 1979), ch. 7.  
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of modern political theory are secularized theological concepts.70 By this he meant 
not only are our public law concepts derived historically from theological ideas, 
particularly those associated with the Roman Church, but also that their 
conceptual logic still mirrors that of the religious concepts from which they are 
derived.71 The theological analogy to the prerogative is the miracle. Both are at 
odds with the existing order (whether material or normative) but by definition 
transcend it. (They are both also, in a sense, emanations of divine authority which 
through their exercise also indicate the existence of the divine.) Both must 
therefore elude full rational treatment. This line of argument, while suggestive, 
fails to grasp the two-faced character of prerogative which is, as we have seen, 
simultaneously mundane and extraordinary. It also depends on the existence of a 
well-defined boundary between prerogative and ordinary law, norm and exception, 
of the type that the common law constitution denies.72 
That is not to say that there is no trace of the miraculous in conceptions of 
the prerogative. Even Blackstone’s account, for all that it drips with urbane irony, 
does not deny this. Indeed, the very etymology and meaning of the word 
‘prerogative’ hints at a relationship with the non-material. The Latin praerogātīva 
referred not only to the tribe that voted first in the Comitia, and by extension a 
prior preference, privilege or claim. It also meant a token or omen. The English 
derivate prerogative took on the more particular meaning: a special right or privilege 
possessed by an individual or groups, or an inherent advantage or privilege. But 
the otherworldly element to the idea did not altogether disappear, at least in the 
context we are discussing, where it was bound up with the idea of majesty. The 
king’s prerogative originally denoted those rights and privileges due to the 
monarch by virtue of his position as feudal overlord. This bundle of original kingly 
rights related almost entirely to land holding. ‘The process of seizing land and 
granting livery of it was a profound expression of lordship, and the exercise of 
prerogative lordship was an equally profound expression of kingship.’73 These 
traditional rights were presented in a text called Prerogativa Regis, a statute (if such it 
was – almost too perfectly, contemporaries were uncertain as to whether it was a 
statute or not)74 passed probably in the reign of Edward I or Edward II.75 These 
feudal rights, although increasingly anachronistic, were exploited more 
systematically during the years of the ‘New Monarchy’ (from the restoration of 
                                                     
70 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, G. Schwab (trans) (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985); Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und Politische Form (Hellerau: Jakob 
Hegner, 1923).  
71 See also G. Buijs, ‘Que les Latins appellant maiestatem: An Exploration into the Theological 
Background of the Concept of Sovereignty’ in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 
2003).  
72 See T. Poole, ‘Constitutional Exceptionalism and Common Law’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 247.  
73 M. McGlynn, The Royal Prerogative and the Learning of the Inns of Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 248.  
74 ibid, 8.  
75 cf E.F. Henderson, ‘The Date of “Prerogativa Regis”’ (1890) 5 English Historical Review, 753 arguing for 
an earlier date in the reign of Henry III.  
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Edward IV to the death of Henry VIII) not only to obtain money for the Crown, 
a necessary obsession of the kings of this period, but also to keep tabs on the 
nobility. The prerogative was, then, ‘a means of inculcating a healthy fear of royal 
power’,76 and played an important role in the move from the early Lancastrian idea 
of the king as first among equals to the Tudor conception of the king as a lonely 
being elevated above even the greatest of his Lords.77 It was only later, with the 
reign of the early Stuart kings, that the prerogative took on its now more familiar 
(Lockean) colouring as an exceptional and emergency power.78  
It would be a mistake to see monarchy as simply a system of rule. As Paul 
Kléber Monod observes, ‘monarchy was not just a system of worldly dominance; 
it was a reflection of God, and an ideal mirror of human identity. It was a link 
between the sacred and the self.’79 We see this idea reflected in the intricate notion 
of the kings’ two bodies, developed by medieval jurists to demonstrate that the 
monarch possesses two personalities or capacities, the natural and the political.80 
The personal and political were intricately connected, and wrapped up within a 
sacral model of authority. ‘The King has been invested by law and religion with a 
character at once despotic and divine. His office has been deemed sacred as a 
delegation from Heaven, and the sacredness of his office has been communicated 
to his person.’81 The mystical head of the political body – the crown – could be 
thought of as being contained within the physical body of the king, an invisible 
element known as his dignitas. While the king’s physical body could expire, the 
dignitas element was immortal.82 Or, as Coke put it more sardonically: ‘The King in 
genere dieth not; but, no question, in individuo, he dieth’. This personal conception 
of authority endured well into the early modern era. In early 17th century England, 
the judges were called upon in the Case of the Post-Nati83 to decide whether a Scot 
born in Edinburgh after James’s accession to the English throne was entitled to 
inherit land in England and enjoy the benefit of English law. The judges decided 
that he could, and in so doing drew upon old theories of authority.84 Allegiance, 
they ruled, was owed not just to the monarch’s crown, that is the corporate body 
or state, but also to his or her natural person as well.85  
The prerogative, as a power that inhered singularly in the king qua king, 
represented a direct emanation of royal authority and so took on a strong sacral 
                                                     
76 n 73 above, 248.  
77 D. Starkey, The English Court: From the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War (London: Longman, 1987), 3. 
78 For an analysis of the economics (as well as politics) behind this move, see M.J. Braddick, State 
Formation in Early Modern England c.1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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81 n 27 above, 24.  
82 n 79 above, 41.  
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hue, becoming ‘an incongruous mixture of real and imaginary qualities...which has 
been called the union of his natural with his mystic or politic capacity’.86 But there 
is an equally important dimension to the prerogative, related to ideas of majesty 
and the personal conception of the state, which reflects the ‘deep structure’ of 
medieval and early modern life. The notion of service was a central organizing 
concept at the time, ‘the dominant condition that tied people to each other and 
the framework that structured the ways in which they lived such relationships’.87 
What we would see today as employment relationships governed by contract, for 
instance, would at the time have been understood in terms of occupational service. 
Allied notions of mastery and service pervaded the political sphere, where service 
was fundamental to contemporary thinking about political relationships. A trope 
of 16th century ‘mirror for princes’ and household conduct-books was the idea of 
the ‘Golden Chain’, informed by rank but not by social status or class, an 
interconnecting and multiply re-enforcing network of service relationships that 
generated bonds of loyalty and reciprocal obligation. The bond between ‘master’ 
and ‘servant’ in this sphere was at once political and intensely personal (or ‘as 
though’ personal), carrying with it obligations of love, affection, and affective 
connection. As Lear says to Kent, ‘Thou serv’st me, and I’ll love thee’.88 The word 
‘love’ stands here for, or intensifies, attitudes of obligation and expectations of 
reciprocal duty: ‘attestations of political love [shift] the valences of the personal 
towards the realities of public service.’89 These networks of service relationships 
generated a structure (or were intended to) in which ‘Authority was besieged with 
obligations of love and care’.90 Since to exist outside service relationships 
altogether would amount to social non-existence, freedom could only be found, in 
the ideology of the time, within the context of such affective bonds. ‘Service’, as 
the Tudor Book of Common Prayer had it, ‘is perfect freedom’.  
The prerogative took shape against this cultural background. Its two faces, at 
once ordinary and special, reflect different aspects of the king’s mastery. The 
prerogative power over the civil service, for instance, at issue in the GCHQ case, 
reflects a master’s prerogative to keep his servants at his beck and call. 
Prerogatives of war, diplomacy, and the preservation of the peace,91 relate to the 
king’s need to secure mastery over all those who threaten his state. The language 
of service is scatted across the old texts on prerogative. (It even appears in the 
passage from Blackstone’s Commentaries quoted earlier.) We can see the operative 
force of this rhetoric in the great case dealing with the prerogative in the imperial 
setting, Campbell v Hall.92 Lord Mansfield sets out in his judgment the 
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proclamation (‘Great Seal’) through which the Crown took possession of Grenada. 
The last sentence of the proclamation speaks of the ‘public peace, welfare, and 
good government’ of our colonies – almost identical to the phrase at issue in 
Bancoult. But the beginning of the text is more interesting for present purposes. It 
reads:  
 
Whereas it will greatly contribute to the speedy settling of our said 
governments, of which the island of Grenada is one, that our loving subjects 
should be informed of our paternal care for the security of the liberties and 
properties of those who are and shall become inhabitants thereof…[The 
proclamation continues by calling for the establishment of a general 
assembly.]  
 
The prerogative fits perfectly the destructive/creative dynamics of the imperial 
enterprise, the taking of new territory in particular. Not only is peace and war 
prerogative’s natural habitat, or one of them. The prerogative is also an instrument 
of lawful authority that carries with it more than a hint of the exceptional, bound 
up as it is with ideas of majesty and command. The common law and the other 
accoutrements of normal, civilized justice might – should – come next. But note in 
particular the phrases ‘our loving subjects’ and ‘our paternal care’ in the 
proclamation. What they indicate is the instigation of a structure or relationship of 
service between the King/Crown and the inhabitants of Grenada. The 
proclamation, in other words, is a performative utterance through which a bond of 
loyalty and affection is to be created. We, with our post-colonial bent and 
recognizing the imbalances of forces in play, might be tempted to read this 
situation entirely cynically. But the utterance was one with real intent and carried 
real consequences, as Campbell v Hall itself illustrates. Lord Mansfield, despite 
finding the 4½% duty imposed in Grenada fair and equitable, ruled it unlawful 
since, where a colony has a representative assembly, taxation could not be 
imposed without its consent or by Act of Parliament. The King thus has no 
floating colonial powers by virtue of his prerogative. His colonial prerogative was 
limited not only by a deeply entrenched ideology and social norms relating to 
service, but also by the demands of ordinary law which reflected that ideology and 
served to embed those norms.  
Far from being an expression of ‘barefaced power’, then, the historical 
prerogative was imbricated within a dense socio-political (and legal) web and 
background ideology of service. One implication of this was that the king was 
bound in exercising his prerogative power, as he was in all his actions, by bonds of 
loyalty and affection. (Or as James I put it, the ‘reciprock and mutuall duetie 
betwixt a free King and his naturall Subjects’.93) Even a tyrant like Macbeth was 
forced to play this game. In the passage already referred to, Macbeth could not 
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openly sweep Banquo from his sight, but was forced into ‘Masking the business 
from the common eye’ because ‘certain friends that are both his and mine / 
Whose loves I may not drop, but wail his fall / Who I myself struck down’. (He 
chose the extra-legal path of political assassination instead.) In early modern 
England, the king himself was seen (and saw himself) as playing the servant’s role 
in his relationship with God. The divine sanction to rule claimed by kings rested 
on serving God well,94 which meant dealing with their subjects in a manner 
compatible with law divine, natural, and human: ‘a king that governes not by his 
lawe, can neither be accountable to God for his administration, nor have a happy 
and established raigne.’95 And, even though the existence of a coercive secular 
jurisdiction over the king would have been almost universally denied in this 
period, the late medieval and early modern state was a ‘law-saturated polity’.96 
There was a deep commitment to law, and the polity was understood to be 
constructed through law. Any suggestion that the prince and his prerogative were 
altogether outside the domain of law would have been met with profound 
hostility. Of such claims were tyrants made. The prince might legitimately claim 
absolute power. But absolute power was not absolute, at least not if it meant a 
supreme, arbitrary authority capable of obliterating the rights of subjects. Bracton, 
writing on the fringes of a wider European debate, granted that the king was legibus 
solutus (not bound by the laws). But what he probably meant was not that the king 
was free to dispense from the law, but that he could legislate but was not free 
from legal norms.97 
The prerogative, which so often provided the legal anvil on which these 
arguments were hammered out, had little in common with the ‘legal black hole’ of 
the modern imagination. Even the great 17th century battles over prerogative 
occurred within or were about the framework of legal and constitutional rule, an 
internal struggle over what existing law actually entailed as opposed to a clash 
between implacably opposed ideologies. But what this state of affairs – being 
unbound by law, and yet bound – meant in practice was a separate question. The 
courts were called to adjudicate upon it at various stages in the worsening crisis. 
Hopes generated by Coke’s assertions about the jurisdictional superiority of the 
common law over prerogative98 were not met. The ‘power of Courts are a delicate 
subject, coming very near to the mystery part of prerogative’, Moore writes in his 
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treatise Act of State in English Law,99 and 17th century judges did little to make it any 
less mysterious. The judges fudged the issue in the Five Knights Case (1627) – ‘We 
are too wise, nay, we are too foolish in undertaking to examine matters of State to 
which we are not born.’100 This pleased no-one, least of all the House of 
Commons which passed the Petition of Right at the first opportunity.101 In the 
Case of Ship Money (1637), the judges accepted (by a majority of 7 to 5) the king’s 
view that Ship Money was not a tax but a service owed to the king in emergency 
to enable him to carry out his duty to defend the realm. The laws know ‘no king-
yoking policy’, one of them said.102 
We are back where we started, with a court split down the middle working 
out liminal questions of law and power, although, to paraphrase Marx, what was 
first tragedy (in Ship Money) is now played out as something more like farce 
(Bancoult). When push comes to shove, it might seem, ‘high’ prerogative cases, 
whether in the 17th century or today, tend to go the government’s way. But, for all 
that, the cases do not show prerogative as a straightforward expression of 
barefaced power and princely will. However wrong the result might have seemed 
to contemporaries, both Ship Money and Bancoult involved exercises of ‘high’ 
prerogative being openly questioned before an independent (or at least not wholly 
subordinate) tribunal where the outcome would not have been certain. Far from 
being an unadulterated expression of princely will, the prerogative operated within 
an all-encompassing network of service relationships, generating bonds of 
allegiance that reached even to God and that carried with them notions of legal 
restraint. Far from being ‘barefaced’, the exercise of prerogative power is often in 
practice occluded and wrapped in half-truths. Or, as Macbeth puts it, ‘Masking the 
business from the common eye, / For sundry weighty reasons.’103 The court is 
often asked to accept, as it were on trust, something that is manifestly less than 
total truth. The question it must ask itself in turn is how much and how hard it 
wants to push against the reality that is presented to it in the name of the rule of 
law.  
 
 
 
THE PREROGATIVE AND THE LAW 
 
We have seen the progression of prerogative from a power vested in the king qua 
feudal overlord to the perquisite of an exalted king bound up in a web of service 
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relations. The final section returns the inquiry to the present. It reflects on the 
contemporary conception of prerogative as a simple set of executive powers to be 
understood against a background conception of ‘horizontal’ political relations 
between democratic equals.  
Let us start by interrogating the post-GCHQ claim that prerogative powers 
are amenable to judicial review in the normal way. The modern Whig would see 
GCHQ and its progeny as having normalised one of the last areas of aberrant 
legality, enabling courts to shine the light of reason into previously obscure 
corners of power. David Dyzenhaus captures this position particularly well in his 
recent work on martial law. While the 20th century saw the development of a state 
governed effectively by the rule of law, he says, the ‘one exception was national 
security and other powers considered to be exercised by prerogative. But both the 
prerogative and national security are now recognised to be amenable to the 
controls of the rule of law, including judicial review.’104  
It is certainly true that, in the modest profusion of prerogative cases since 
GCHQ, almost none have been held to be non-justiciable.105 The rolling back of 
Lord Roskill’s ‘excluded categories’ of powers supposedly immune from judicial 
scrutiny provides a textbook illustration, the Whig might be tempted to say, of the 
teleology of the common law, its antipathy to hidden power and its aspiration to 
liberty.106 Two and a half decades on from GCHQ, most of Lord Roskill’s 
catalogue is now in principle open to review. But it is not just that the range of 
reviewable prerogative powers has increased. In some areas, judicial review now 
penetrates deeper.107 The best example of this development relates to the 
prerogative of mercy.108 Before GCHQ, the courts would simply not have 
examined a mercy decision: ‘It is outside the competence of the courts to call it 
into question: Nor would they wish to do so.’109 ‘Mercy is not the subject of legal 
rights. It begins where legal rights end.’110 In Bentley, decided after GCHQ, the 
sister of a man executed for murder successfully challenged the Home Secretary’s 
                                                     
104 D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Puzzle of Martial Law’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 41.  
105 One possible exception is R (Gentle) v The Prime Minister [2006] UKHL 20, where the House of Lords 
rejected a claim brought by relatives of servicemen and women killed in Iraq that the right to life under 
Article 2 ECHR required the government to set up an inquiry into the lawfulness of the decision to go to 
war in Iraq. Lord Bingham referred (at [8]) to ‘the restraint traditionally shown by the courts in ruling on 
what has been called high policy – peace and war, the making of treaties, the conduct of foreign 
relations’.  
106 See, eg, T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Conception of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  
107 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] UKHL 3; [1195] 2 A.C. 513 
involved a successful challenge to the government’s attempt to invoke prerogative powers to instigate a 
compensation scheme that differed in key respects to one that had been authorized by an Act of 
Parliament. The case is probably best understood, however, in traditional terms; that is, as an elaboration 
of the principle in De Keyser case (n 39 above) protecting the authority of Acts of Parliament against 
exercises of the prerogative.  
108 See also the review of the prerogative power to issue passports: eg, R v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Everett [1988] EWCA Civ 7; [1989] Q.B. 811. Although the familiar disjunction 
between principle and result, rhetoric and reality occurs in this case – the claimant lost. See also Mohit v 
Director of Public Prosecutions of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20 (successful challenge to prosecution policy).  
109 Hanratty v Lord Butler [1971] unreported Court of Appeal judgment.   
110 Defreitas v Benny [1976] AC 234, 247 (Lord Diplock).  
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refusal to grant a posthumous pardon. The decision was influenced by a 
succession of Privy Council decisions in death penalty appeals from 
Commonwealth Caribbean states.111 The prerogative of mercy should not now be 
seen, the court said, as an ‘arbitrary monarchical right of grace and favour’, but 
rather as a ‘constitutional safeguard against mistakes’.112 Bentley offers a rare 
example of a claimant winning in a prerogative case.113 But even here there are still 
traces of abnormality within the judgment. At the close of the case, the court 
declined to make a formal order, but instead invited the Home Secretary to look at 
the matter again. Despite the constitutionalist rhetoric that marks the judgment, 
then, the case still shows some signs of reticence in the handling of the 
prerogative.  
A wider gap between rhetoric and reality, principle and result, is more typical 
of prerogative cases, a gap that tends to be particularly pronounced where the 
power in question approaches ‘forbidden zones’ of high policy. In no area of 
public law, Adam Tomkins remarks, ‘are the courts as reluctant to review 
government actions and decisions as when they touch upon the prerogative.’114 
The GCHQ case itself, the originary decision in the modern series, fits this profile. 
So too does Bancoult. Both cases contain a similar process of reasoning that I will 
call the prerogative two-step: Step one, the refusal to countenance the idea of a 
gap in the normal framework of the law and the assertion that ordinary legal 
principles apply to prerogative law-making. Step two, the accommodation of 
government interests (‘act of state’; ‘national security’) and equivocation or 
uncertainty in the application of those principles.  
This two-step will be familiar to those who are conversant with the cases. In 
the treaty-making context, for instance, the courts have moved away from a 
previous stance whereby these matters were taken to be non-justiciable115 to a 
more subtle position in which review is open, even invited,116 but the exercise of 
that review is light touch in the extreme.117 The pattern is replicated in the 
diplomatic context more generally, as two cases brought on behalf of Guantanamo 
Bay detainees illustrate. The judges in those cases dutifully intoned the post-
GCHQ mantra that it ‘is not an answer to a claim of judicial review to say that the 
                                                     
111 See, eg, Pratt and Morgan v A.G of Jamaica [1993] 4 All ER 769; Lewis v A.G. of Jamaica [2001] 2 AC 50. 
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source of the power’ is the prerogative. But they also said that ‘the court cannot 
enter the forbidden areas, including decisions affecting foreign policy’.118 The 
result was the weakest of weak rights: a legitimate expectation that the Foreign 
Office would consider whether to take action on the detainee’s behalf. That 
minimal obligation, needless to say, had already been discharged in both cases.119 
Indeed, one is hard pressed to think of any circumstance where it might prove 
useful, save perhaps to assuage judicial feelings of guilt and inadequacy.120  
On reading these cases, it is hard not to sympathize with Elliott and Perreau-
Saussine’s mordant observations on the pyrrhic nature of judicial review of the 
prerogative. Reflecting specifically on Bancoult, which they see as ‘of a piece with 
[earlier] path-breaking cases’, the authors conclude that ‘one more such victory 
could utterly undo those public lawyers who defend the existence of constitutional 
legal constraints on the use of prerogative power’.121 The implicit accusation is that 
the courts’ approach to reviewing prerogative is now anachronistic – the courts 
have not fully jettisoned outdated vertical and personal conceptions of authority 
from which prerogative derived. To the extent that this accusation holds true, it 
shows how the evolutionary nature (or ‘past-ness’) of judicial review can serve not 
just to shore up established liberal positions against claims for exceptional and 
illiberal new powers, but can also enable old positions to resonate long after their 
normative relevance has declined. (This does nothing in itself to dent Elliott and 
Perreau-Saussine’s point. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said, ‘It is revolting to have 
no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.’122) 
But I suspect that there is something more at work here, beyond 
straightforward anachronism. This is not to say that there are no anachronistic 
elements in these cases. The prerogative form, inextricably related as it is to a time 
when kings had power,123 can be nothing else: its operative premises simply do not 
match core elements of democratic constitutionalism. (But, then again, much the 
same could be said about other, more standard features of the British 
Constitution.) But perhaps it is better to understand the prerogative as a political 
statement, one that carries with it a certain ring derived no doubt from the personal 
and sacral characteristics that clung to prerogative power in times past, but which 
are now refracted through the notion of (populist) democracy and the need for 
government to be responsive to popular demands. (Recall Hamilton on the 
executive qualities – ‘decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch’.124) More than an 
                                                     
118 R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 at [106]. 
119 See also R (Al-Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 1279.  
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123 cf A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885, London: Macmillan, 10th ed, 
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echo remains of the connection between prerogative power and personal 
authority. Although its controversial nature means that exercising the prerogative 
may sound a warning to other political actors, particularly the courts, to tap into 
prerogative is still to tap into a source of charismatic authority. This does not, and 
probably could not, appear on the surface of the cases. But it does help to explain 
the prevalence and persistence of the two-step. The use of prerogative amounts to 
a ‘speech act’ (more precisely, an indirect illocutionary act125) whereby government 
seeks to put itself in a particular position vis-à-vis the court. This is a special 
domain, it asserts, where special conditions apply. Courts should be mindful to 
tread warily.  
This pattern in cases involving the prerogative in the strict sense is worrying 
enough for believers in the ‘rule of law project’.126 But more troubling still is the 
existence of a similar two-step in cases where the prerogative in its broader sense 
operates. In terrorism cases, for instance,127 courts have taken a hard line on 
government arguments asserting a right to be free from legal constraint. At the 
level of principle, that is, they emphasize the application of settled, standing law 
(step 1). But the cases also typically contain strong doses of deference in the 
application of those principles (step 2). The House of Lords’ decision in the 
torture evidence case is a perfect illustration. On the question of principle, the Law 
Lords were emphatic: the condemnation of torture was a ‘constitutional principle’, 
reflecting both a ‘deeply-rooted tradition and an international obligation solemnly 
and explicitly undertaken’.128 But when it came to matters of detail, their approach 
was more conciliatory.129 The test to be applied, they said, was for evidence to be 
excluded where on the balance of probabilities it had been obtained by torture. 
This meant not only that evidence should be let in if there was doubt about its 
provenance, but also that the terrorist suspect would be in the invidious position 
of needing to raise a plausible case that evidence, about which he might know little 
or nothing and that would probably have been obtained through half-secret 
intelligence back-channels, had been obtained through torture. Subsequent cases, 
while less dramatic, have followed a broadly similar path.130 Even the applicants’ 
victory in the Belmarsh case,131 which largely bucks the trend,132 looks less 
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convincing in light of subsequent events. For one thing, the practice of internment 
criticized in the case was replaced by a system of control orders that was in most 
ways little better and in some ways worse than what preceded it. The courts have 
found it hard to deal with this new system of exceptional control, partly no doubt 
because they feel complicit in its genesis.133 For another, Belmarsh led to a backlash 
against the court and persistent threats to amend or repeal the Human Rights Act 
and curb the court’s powers of review.134 
In recognizing, albeit obliquely, the continued importance of personal and 
charismatic modes of authority, the prerogative cases reveal a fissure in modern 
conceptions of constitutional rule. For the sacral element did not disappear with 
the removal of kings from the political landscape; rather, it was transmogrified. 
Paul Kahn, in a disquisition on sovereignty and violence, refers to this ‘changing 
locus of the sacred’, and remarks that the ‘popular sovereign remains as mystical 
and sacred an entity as the king ever was.’135 Sovereignty and charismatic or 
personal authority, once residing (somehow) in the body of the King, have 
separated, the former resting with ‘the people’, the latter embodied in the figure of 
a government or Leader, in whom we are asked to place our faith, our trust. 
Vertical relations are supposedly anathema within a structure of political equals. 
There are no servants now; and neither are there masters. The gap that previously 
existed between the law and those subject to it closes. Living in a horizontal 
political universe means that there is in principle no separation between the citizen 
and the acts of government, for they are now our acts – or at least acts done in our 
name. ‘The sovereign god is no longer at a distance; mediation is no longer 
necessary.’136  
But this horizontal structure, familiar though it is, carries with it certain 
dangers. It is an often remarked upon paradox that the older, vertical structures of 
rule, with their conditioning ideology of service, allegiance, and (political) love, 
often tended to be less oppressive than the more egalitarian systems that replaced 
them. As the powers of noblemen and princes waned, the new type of power that 
emerged turned out to be ‘more centralized, more enterprising, more absolute, 
more extensive’ than those it replaced.137 Modern political systems seem almost 
structurally inclined towards the aggregation of power. ‘Contemporary societies 
are tempted by unlimited power, much more than was true, in the premodern age, 
even of the king most jealous of his absolute sovereignty.’138  
This situation is particularly problematic in a world inhabited by 
Tocquevillian individualists. To see why, we can turn to Hobbes’s acute 
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identification of the interplay of love and hatred that attends indebtedness. 
Political debts are also personal, particularly in a political world characterized by 
consumerism. Hobbes argued that to receive benefits from an acknowledged 
superior inclines one to love. Likewise, to receive benefits from an equal where 
‘there is hope of requital’ also ‘disposeth to love’. (Indeed, the relationship 
between equals where there exists an equal obligation of ‘aid and service mutual’ is 
the best of all possible worlds ‘wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and 
the other revenged by confessing it.’ It might also be said to equate to the ideal 
structure of republican citizenship.) In stark contrast, however, we develop a 
‘secret hatred’ towards an equal from whom we receive ‘greater benefits than there 
is hope to requite’.139 Acts of love turn into conditions of hatred in relationships 
of equality because, by incurring debts that can never repaid, they create a 
psychology of perpetual service with which love between equals is incompatible.140 
If Hobbes is right, then it may be that ‘late’ democratic systems exist in an 
unstable equilibrium. The argument from Hobbes is as follows: Tocquevillian 
individuals function as political consumerists, demanding action from government. 
Government responds to those demands (following the logic of modern 
democratic rule) by passing new laws and accruing more powers. But consumerist 
appetite is insatiable. Government action simply drives calls for more action. The 
government’s action can no longer be seen as a gift from one equal to another, of 
the sort that can turn the polity towards self-love (which corresponds to the ideal 
of republican citizenship). For one thing, the consumerist understands himself as 
having no reciprocal duty to government that might generate such a sentiment. 
For another, the government has become too powerful to be considered a political 
equal. The consumerist logic is more likely to generate feelings of self-hatred and 
mutual distrust – which in turn drives demands for more government action. The 
result: Tocqueville’s nightmare. In such conditions, more power equals more 
separation between people and government equals more self-hatred and fear.141 
This is not meant to be a counsel of despair. There is nothing inevitable 
about the consumerist-driven downward spiral. The paradigm of consumerist 
politics exists alongside and competes with other conceptions of the relationship 
between government and governed – republican citizenship, for instance. Perhaps 
the grand narrative for judicial review in the future can be constructed in these 
terms. We might understand the function of judicial review, forever tugging on 
Superman’s cape,142 as a contribution to shoring up a republican conception of 
politics as one of equals equally bound. Certainly, political disputes are more likely 
than ever to be played out at least partly in a legal register and argued before 
courts. As this study of law and the prerogative shows, the courts have done much 
                                                     
139 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, The First Part, Chapter 11 ‘Of the Difference of Manners’. 
140 See Schalkwyk, n 87 above, 182. 
141 For a parallel analysis, see A. Somek, Individualism: an Essay on the Authority of the European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
142 M. Taggart, ‘Tugging on Superman’s Cape: Lessons from Experience with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990’ (1998) Public Law, 266.   
  
Thomas Poole                                    Judicial Review at the Margins  
 
 25
to fashion judicial review so that it becomes possible to bring previously half-
immune exercises of power within the domain of ‘ordinary’ law. However, greater 
attention needs to be paid not just to the gaps that continue to operate in the 
application of the ordinary law to the prerogative strictly so called, but also and 
more generally to the relationship between that law and the ‘resurgent prerogative’ 
that now plays out in the context of the politics of security and fear. 
